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barriers to doing business appear to vary widely across regions and 
countries, it has also been asserted that the business environment will affect 
aggregate performance. The common underlying assumption is that 
countries and firms facing ‘better’ business environments can be expected to 
perform better This paper attempts to evaluate the robustness of these 
conclusions using two types of data. The first comprises a large firm level 
dataset — the 2002 and 2005 rounds of the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (henceforth BEEPS) — that includes 
measures of firm performance, variables relating to ownership, competition 
and export orientation as well as perceptions of the business environment. 
The dataset covers between 6–9,000 firms in 26 transition countries. The 
second — country level — dataset comprises the World Bank’s annual 
‘Doing Business’ survey that covers 175 countries. While this survey has 
relatively few observations over time — data collection only started in 2003 
— it has large country coverage and has already been widely used in cross-
country analysis. In this paper, the Doing Business measures are primarily 
used to try and establish whether there is any link from country-level 
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It is commonly accepted that the business environment — encompass-
ing features of the legal, regulatory, financial, and institutional system of a 
country — has an impact on the performance of firms. As barriers to doing 
business appear to vary widely across regions and countries, it has also 
been asserted that the business environment will affect aggregate perform-
ance. As such, empirical investigation of these conjectures can proceed at 
both firm and country levels. The collection of firm level datasets by or-
ganisations such as the EBRD has gone alongside the collection of country 
level information attempting to measure dimensions of the business envi-
ronment; the World Bank’s annual ‘Doing Business’ survey is a case in 
point. Simply stated, the common underlying assumption is that countries 
and firms facing ‘better’ business environments can be expected to perform 
better1.  
This paper attempts to evaluate the robustness of these conclusions us-
ing two types of data. The first comprises a large firm level dataset — the 
2002 and 2005 rounds of the Business Environment and Enterprise Per-
formance Survey (henceforth BEEPS)2 — that includes measures of firm 
performance, variables relating to ownership, competition and export ori-
entation as well as perceptions of the business environment. The dataset 
covers between 6–9,000 firms in 26 transition countries. As the two rounds 
of the survey provide data on firms over a six year period, they allow ex-
amination of the relationship over time between performance and a range 
of explanatory variables, including the business environment. They can 
also throw light on the links from constraints to actions, like restructuring, 
that have been a critical feature of the transition.  
The second — country level — dataset comprises the World Bank’s 
annual ‘Doing Business’ survey that covers 175 countries. For this survey, 
a questionnaire organised around a hypothetical business case is adminis-
tered to a range of expert respondents in each country. The full set of Do-
ing Business indicators are then put together in an aggregate ranking that 
aims to summarise a country’s ease of doing business. While this survey 
has relatively few observations over time — data collection only started in 
2003 — it has large country coverage and has already been widely used in 
cross-country analysis. In this paper, the Doing Business measures are 
                                                          
1 For example, Djankov et al (2006) argue that when using a simple average of 
country rankings from ‘Doing Business’ as an aggregate measure of the business envi-
ronment, an improvement in a country’s indicators from being in the lowest quartile to 
the best would imply a 2.3% improvement in annual growth. 
2 The dataset is collected by EBRD and the World Bank and has had three 
rounds, 1999, 2002 and 2005. A fourth round is being implemented in 2008. 
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primarily used to try and establish whether there is any link from country-
level measures of the business environment to country-level performance. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 provides an overview of 
the recent literature — theoretical and empirical — on the business envi-
ronment. Section 2 then turns in detail to analysis of the BEEPS firm-level 
dataset. Section 3 moves the focus to the level of the country and asks 
whether the Doing Business indicators can help explain differences in per-
formance across countries. As we find that both the firm and country level 
findings provide scant support for the view that the business environment 
exerts a strong and measurable impact on performance, Section 4 asks why 
this might be the case. Section 5 concludes.    
2. Literature review 
The theoretical literature identifies differences in institutions as one of 
the key sources of differences in gross country income and growth rates. 
Most generally, Parente and Prescott (1994) argue that broadly defined in-
stitutional barriers increase the cost of technology adoption and hence re-
duce long-term income per capita. Other authors have focussed more on 
the relationship between performance and specific frictions such as, credit 
constraints (for example, Gertler and Rogoff, 1990, Banerjee, et. al, 1993, 
Aghion et. al., 2003 and 2005), contract enforceability (for example, 
Quintin, 2003, Acemoglu et. al. 2006), investor protection (for example, 
Rui et al. 2004) and entry costs (for example, Marimon and Quadrini, 
2006, Aghion et. al., 2006). However, while in general this body of work 
holds that worse institutions should imply worse performance, the litera-
ture also suggests that such relationships are not necessarily linear and 
monotonic.  
The links between institutions and performance have also been ana-
lysed in a large and growing empirical literature. However, the bulk of the 
research relies on country-level proxy indicators of the business environ-
ment, such as governance (for example, Kaufmann et al., 1999, 2002, 
2006), regulatory constraints (for example, Djankov et al., 2002, and Bo-
tero et al. 2004), competitiveness (for example, the World Economic Fo-
rum’s Global Competitiveness Report), transparency (for example, the 
country ratings produced by Transparency International), bureaucratic 
quality, corruption and law and order (for example, the work of Political 
Risk Services), strength of the legal system (Durnev and Kim, 2005), and 
the level of economic freedom in an economy (for example, the Heritage 
Foundation’s Annual Report). Knack and Keefer (1995) and Hall and 
Jones (1999) also find a correlation between measures of property rights 
and GDP per capita.  
A feature common in much of the country level research is that most 
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of the aggregate proxies used in the research contain relatively little or no 
variation over time and are hence largely indistinguishable from country-, 
sector- or region-specific effects that may reflect other features than the 
business environment. Moreover, these aggregate studies usually estimate 
the association between features of business environment and macroeco-
nomic performance rather than identify the causal effects of the environ-
ment on performance (for example, Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998 and others). However, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001) try to establish a causal relationship by using mortality rates of 
European colonialists as an instrument for current institutions. Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2005) further try to separate the effect of property rights in-
stitutions from that of contracting institutions. They find that the former 
have a first-order effect on performance, while the latter matter only 
through their impact on financial intermediation.   
A further body of empirical research relies primarily on industry or 
firm level survey data to try and look at the links between performance and 
constraints. Industry level studies (for example, Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
Klapper et al (2004)) can control for country and industry effects but have 
the disadvantage that they use a benchmark country where the optimal 
value of the business environment has to be assumed.  In many developing 
countries, industry level evidence is lacking.   
At the firm level, data collection using specifically designed surveys 
has been widely adopted. For example, the World Bank has implemented 
over 135 surveys in over 70 countries between 1999 and 2005. In most in-
stances, these surveys ask firm respondents in considerable detail about the 
sort of constraints that they commonly face and the perceived intensity of 
those constraints. They often try to order perceptions of the strength and 
the relative importance of particular constraints for particular firms.  These 
surveys also ask in detail about firm level performance over specific refer-
ence periods.  
A range of studies using these firm level surveys has now claimed to 
find a strong link between the variation in performance and perceived con-
straints (for example, Beck et al (2005), Ayagari et al (2005), Hallward-
Driemeier et al (2006). Yet, looking at the links from the business envi-
ronment to performance in this literature raises a number of methodologi-
cal considerations concerning the possibility of biased estimates due to er-
rors in variables, omitted variables and the endogeneity of regressors.    
Common to all these studies, whether conducted at country, industry 
or firm level, has been the desire, first, to measure the principal constraints 
on a country, industry or firms’ performance and then to measure the size 
of the effect of a constraint, whether with respect to an individual con-
straint or a set of constraints, on performance. Underlying this approach is 
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the obvious idea that understanding the type and consequences of con-
straints helps in the formulation of appropriate policy for addressing those 
constraints. Indeed, the analysis of these data series has also been linked to 
explicit policy conclusions (for example, World Development Report 
(2000)).  
3. Firm level analysis 
In what follows, the 2002 and 2005 rounds of the BEEPS are used3. 
The BEEPS is a stratified random sample of firms in 26 transition coun-
tries. Around 90 per cent of the BEEPS sample in both years comprised 
small and medium enterprises. Most firms in the samples had been priva-
tised or were always private4. The 2002 round of the BEEPS surveyed over 
6,100 firms while the 2005 round covered nearly 9,100 firms in the same 
countries. Table 1 provides some simple descriptive statistics. The average 
age of the firms in the sample was around 15 years, while firm size in em-
ployment ranged between 105 and 143. On average, exports comprised be-
tween 9–11% of total sales. In general, the main variables show reasonable 
mean values and significant variation.  The lower part of Table 1 also re-
ports the average scores and standard deviations for the constraints where 1 
indicates no obstacle and 4 is a major obstacle. Each firm’s top manager 
was asked to provide their perception of the constraints. Tax rates, uncer-
tainty about regulatory policies and cost of financing were clearly viewed 
as important obstacles. Yet, not only is there large variation in mean values 
across perceived constraints but also the standard deviations are large in 
almost all instances. 
To analyse the determinants of the efficiency with which the firms 
generate sales revenue from inputs, an augmented Cobb Douglas revenue 
function is used: 
 
ititititiktkkit vTCIZxy εςθδρββ +++++++= ∑ lnln 0 ,                      (1)  
 
where yit represents the revenue of firm i in period t, x's represent the capi-
tal and labour inputs, Zit is a vector of the business environment and struc-
tural variables (business constraints, export orientation of the firm, extent 
of product market competition and firm ownership), the I's, C’s and T’s 
                                                          
3 For a more detailed analysis, see Commander and Svejnar (2008). 
4 Quota sampling was used for foreign owned and state-owned companies and set 
at 10 per cent of the total sample for each category. The distribution between manufac-
turing and service sectors was according to their relative contribution to GDP in each 
country. Firms subject to government price regulation and prudential supervision were 
excluded, as were firms with 10,000 employees or more were also excluded as well as 
firms that started operations in 2002–2004. 
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denote a set of dummy variables for industries, countries and years, respec-
tively, vi is an unobserved time-invariant firm-specific effect that is con-
trolled for in some estimations, and εit is an independently distributed error 
term.  Equation (1) allows efficiency to vary across institutional and struc-
tural variables, industries, countries and time. 
When estimating (1), an obvious issue is how best to control for the 
potential endogeneity/selection issues related to some of the explanatory 
variables. In particular, given the nature of the privatisation process, firm 
ownership may not be assigned at random, and there is generally a need to 
account for possible unobserved heterogeneity and, hence, to isolate the ef-
fect of inputs, perceived business environment and structural factors on a 
firm’s performance from the effects of performance on these explanatory 
variables. To deal with this, an instrumental variables (IV) approach is 
used.  For several key variables, the 2002 and 2005 samples provide in-
formation on the rate of change between 1999 and 2002, and between 2002 
and 2005, so that lagged three-year differences in some of these variables 
can be used as potential instrumental variables. For each year in each firm, 
there are also data on the number of workers with university and secondary 
education. Following Marschak and Andrews (1944) and Schmidt (1988), 
the ratio of these two inputs (skill ratio) is used as an instrumental vari-
able.5  The use of a skill ratio relies on the exogeneity of the ratio of wages 
of the more and less educated workers at the firm-level, and on variation in 
this wage ratio across regions and countries.  Since firms in the survey op-
erate in very different regions and countries, the ratio of wages of workers 
with greater and lesser education is likely to vary considerably across ob-
servations.  
The approach has been to estimate the first stage regressions with as 
few IVs as possible, while ensuring that the IVs have adequate explanatory 
power and pass the over-identification tests. In particular, equation (1) has 
been estimated in levels on the pooled 2002 and 2005 samples of firms and 
the IVs used have been the age and location of the firm, the skill ratio in-
teracted with the three main regions covered by the data,6 the skill ratio in-
teracted with firm age and the three regions, a three-year lagged number of 
full time employees, the change in fixed assets in the preceding three years, 
                                                          
5 The rationale for this instrument comes from economic optimization and an as-
sumed exogeneity of input prices (wages). If the production function is Cobb-Douglas 
and the firm maximizes profit or minimizes cost, the first order conditions dictate that 
the ratio of inputs equal the ratio of input prices and technological parameters. If the 
firm is a price taker in the input market, the ratio of inputs reflects these exogenous 
factors. 
6 The regions are (a) Central Europe and Baltics, (b) the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS), and (c) Southeastern Europe. 
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and the change in the export share over the preceding three years. These 
variables have been used as instruments for the levels of the capital and la-
bour inputs, categories of ownership and the export orientation of the firm. 
The IVs are found to be good predictors of all the potentially endogenous 
variables and pass the J (Sargan) over-identification test. The extent of 
competition in the firm’s product market is viewed as exogenous to a given 
firm.  
Finally, in order to assess the robustness of the results with respect to 
the business environment, an average value of each constraint has been 
used. The average has been based on responses either by all other firms in 
a given industry in each country and year, or by all other firms of a given 
size in a given industry in each country and year. The advantage of using 
the responses of other firms that are subject to the same external shocks is 
that the value of the constraint is not affected by the firm’s own perform-
ance. This approach gives both a considerable variation in the values of 
constraints and a sufficient number of firms per cell to minimise problems 
associated with potential measurement error. The standard errors of all es-
timates are clustered by year, country, industry and firm size7. 
Table 2 contains the baseline IV estimates without the explanatory 
variables capturing the business environment constraints. These regres-
sions use pooled data from the entire 2002 and 2005 BEEPS.  The number 
of observations varies from 5,624 to 5,897 and all regressions include 
country, year and sector fixed effects. State ownership serves as the refer-
ence.  
Column 1 reports a base estimate where just the two factors — labour 
and capital — are included. The labour coefficient is relatively small and 
not statistically significant. Column 2 adds in the ratio of exports to sales 
and this variable enters positively and significantly. Columns 3 and 4 in-
troduce the competition variable — defined as 1 if the firm has three or 
more competitors and 0 otherwise. Entered alone with the inputs the coef-
ficient is positive, but small and insignificant. This is also the case when 
competition is entered alongside the export share and controlling for in-
puts. The coefficient on the export share remains large and highly signifi-
cant. Columns 5–8 introduce the ownership variables. In these specifica-
tions the labour and capital coefficients are both positive and statistically 
significant, and their sum approaches unity. The coefficients on both the 
privatised and new private firms are negative and, in the latter case, mar-
ginally significant in two of the four specifications. By contrast, foreign 
ownership has a large and positive coefficient that is significant at the 1% 
level. The positive effect of foreign ownership is maintained but the sig-
                                                          
7 In Commander and Svejnar (2008) other options are also explored. 
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nificance of the negative effect of new private ownership disappears when 
the export share and competition variables are entered. Interestingly, when 
controlling for ownership, the export share variable loses all significance. 
In Columns 7 and 8, where most or all of the explanatory variables are en-
tered simultaneously, we find that competition has a small, positive and 
significant (at 10% level) impact on performance, with foreign ownership 
exerting a strong and positive impact on performance as well. Being priva-
tised or being a new private firm remains negatively signed but insignifi-
cant relative to state-owned firms. The augmented specifications in Col-
umns 5–8 also generate acceptable values of the J and F tests related to the 
selection of IVs in the first stage of estimation. The preferred (all-
encompassing) specification in Column 8 points to the importance of for-
eign ownership and, to a lesser extent, competition on performance.  
The next stage is to consider directly the impact of business environ-
ment constraints on firm performance. For each constraint, the average of 
responses of other firms in the same 2 digit sector, firm size (small, me-
dium and large), country and year are used. Entering all 15 categories of 
constraints invariably yields insignificant estimates and the question natu-
rally arises as to whether collinearity across constraints accounts for this 
insignificance. Most constraints are actually not highly correlated, although 
several pairs display high correlation (e.g., access to financing and cost of 
financing, tax rates and tax administration, uncertainty about regulatory 
policies and macroeconomic instability, and street crime and organized 
crime). This pairwise correlation is also detected in an ANOVA regression 
that was run to assess the extent to which the variation in the value of any 
given constraint can be explained by the other constraints. In what follows, 
only one of these pairwise correlated constraint variables is entered, noting 
that it generally does not matter which of the two is entered. The constraint 
related to labour regulation is excluded as it is almost completely explained 
by the interaction of country and year fixed effects and hence insignificant. 
This leaves nine constraints whose effects are now analysed.  
Table 3 provides a first pass at including the nine constraints in the 
performance regression — individually (Columns 1–9), as an average of all 
nine constraints (Column 10) and with all nine constraints entered together 
(Column 11). Despite the obvious omitted variable problem, we report the 
specifications with the constraints entered one at a time because this ap-
proach has been used frequently in the literature and much of the accepted 
wisdom on the effects of institutions and regulation on performance de-
rives from these types of specifications. In line with much of the literature, 
the regressions in Table 3 are without country, year and sector fixed ef-
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fects8. It can be seen that when entered individually, all except one of the 
constraints enter negatively — as would be expected — and most are sig-
nificant at 1% or 5% levels. These specifications appear to replicate the 
conventional wisdom that the business/institutional environment matters. 
The regression with the average value of all nine constraints also yields a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient. When all the constraints 
are entered simultaneously in the IV estimation in Table 3, the infrastruc-
ture and, to a lesser extent, tax rate and macro instability constraints remain 
negative and significant, but others lose significance or, in the case of 
crime, theft and disorder, become positive and significant. Hence, correct-
ing — at least in part — for the possible omitted variables problem, the 
negative effect of most business environment constraints on performance 
disappears.  
Table 4 repeats the same exercise but includes country, year and sec-
tor fixed effects whose omission may have biased the estimates. In this 
case, the significance of the coefficients on inputs, ownership, exports and 
competition correspond to those in the base estimations in Table 2. How-
ever, the picture changes substantially with respect to the business envi-
ronment constraints. While most of the constraint terms entered individu-
ally retain their negative sign, only one — corruption — is significant. The 
effect of the average of all constraints, reported in Column 10, is statisti-
cally insignificant, as are all the constraint coefficients in Column 11 
where all constraints are entered simultaneously. An examination of the 
role played by the country, year and sector effects indicates that it is the 
country as well as country cum year fixed effects in particular that serve to 
knock out the significance of the individual constraints. Hence, controlling 
for country-wide differences in the ‘business environment’ (together with 
aggregate shocks and other effects), the negative effects of most constraints 
disappear. 
The analysis was extended by also looking at the possible impact that 
interactions of constraints might have on performance, in line with recent 
explorations in the development literature (see, for example, Aghion et al., 
2005, 2006). The intuition here is that, say, corruption may or may not 
have a direct impact itself, but may exert an effect through its association 
with other constraints related to government policies and regulations, such 
as the functioning of the judiciary, uncertainty about regulatory policies, 
labour regulations, business licensing, and tax administration and tax rates. 
However, neither when the interactions were entered one at a time, nor 
                                                          
8 Note that this model appears to be mis-specified compared to a model that in-
cludes these fixed effects in that the labour coefficient is small and insignificant, and 
the p values on the J test are very small. 
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when all were entered simultaneously, were statistically significant results 
found9.  
One important result from the analysis is that country differences, pre-
sumably in the overall business environment, but also in other aspects, 
matter for firm performance while the within-country cross-firm differ-
ences do not. Closer inspection of the country fixed effects reveals that 
while not all are significant, the ranking of countries that occurs corre-
sponds to a significant extent to what might be expected from other indica-
tors, such as the EBRD transition indicators10. However, the rankings are 
not stable and have a number of unexpected features, suggesting that the 
country effects are also capturing other sources of heterogeneity, such as 
differences in accounting and reporting systems. For these very reasons, it 
is desirable to control for country effects as they capture many features of 
heterogeneity, rather than excluding them or attributing the cross-country 
heterogeneity to just a single factor, such as a particular aspect of the busi-
ness environment.  
In view of the findings based on manager perceptions of the business 
environment, it is interesting to ask whether other measures of the business 
environment produce similar results. To this end, the firm-level data were 
also merged with the Doing Business indicators that are used in the next 
section of this paper11. When entering the Doing Business indicators indi-
vidually into the IV regressions in a specification with country, industry 
and year fixed effects, only four of the twelve indicators generated the ex-
pected negative coefficients. In the IV regressions without fixed effects, 
only two of the twelve indicators had negative effects. Moreover, the indi-
cators with the negative coefficients were not the same ones across specifi-
cations. In other words, widely used country-level indicators of the busi-
ness/institutional environment do not provide strong evidence of a negative 
relationship between the constraining environment and firm performance.  
4. Country level analysis 
Turning to the country level analysis, the dataset that is used is the 
World Bank’s Doing Business survey12. Doing Business employs a tem-
                                                          
9 See Commander and Svejnar (2008) for results and more extended discussion. 
10 See the EBRD annual ‘Transition Reports’. 
11 These are, the number of procedures to register a business, time to register a 
business, cost of registering a business, rigidity of employment regulations, restrictions 
on firing workers, cost of firing a worker, number of procedures to enforce a contract 
payment after default, time to enforce a contract payment after default, cost of enforc-
ing a contract payment after default, time to effectuate bankruptcy, cost of effectuating 
bankruptcy, and recovery rate in a bankruptcy. 
12 See Commander and Tinn (2008) for a fuller analysis. 
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plate questionnaire targeted at local professionals in a variety of fields, in-
cluding lawyers, officials and consultants. The questionnaire is organised 
around a hypothetical business case and then administered to a range of 
expert respondents in each country. It has now been administered up to five 
times between 2003 and 2007. In 2007 over 5000 experts were contacted in 
175 countries. Information on ten indicators was collected in 200713. How-
ever, information on only five sets of indicators has been collected for all 
years since 200314. The full set of Doing Business indicators are also put 
together in an aggregate ranking that aims to summarise a country’s ease of 
doing business. It should be noted that each country has a unique indicator, 
a heroic assumption for large and diverse countries, such as Brazil or India. 
There area also a number of quite restrictive assumptions made about the 
representative firm15.  
The philosophy behind Doing Business has causality running from in-
stitutions to performance. Identifying these effects will, however, raise ob-
vious issues of endogeneity. Further, while performance can be summa-
rised by country level growth, there is evidently a set of hypothesised rela-
tionships between the Doing Business indicators and intermediate out-
comes. These are indicated in Appendix Table 1. Both final and intermedi-
ate outcomes will be used in the analysis below. 
 
4.1 Business environment and country performance 
This section first looks at the relationship between country-level per-
formance and the Doing Business indicators. Second, the relationship be-
tween intermediate outcomes and performance is analysed.  
The country level analysis is done in the spirit of the cross-country 
growth analysis of Barro and Sala-i-Martin(1998). However, due to limited 
availability of data, only the relationship between growth over the period 
2003-2005 and the Doing Business indicators available for 2003 can be 
explored.  Equation 2 is estimated;  
 
εδγβα ++++== XDBGDPGDPGDPGrowth pc 20032003,20032005 )ln()/ln( ,    (2) 
 
where the growth measure is the log difference of real PPP adjusted GDP. 
On the right hand side of the equation, the log of PPP adjusted GDP in 
2003, the Doing Business indicators available for 2003 and an additional 
                                                          
13 Namely, starting a business; employment regulation; enforcing contracts; get-
ting credit; closing a business; registering property; protecting investors; dealing with 
licenses; paying taxes and trading across borders. 
14 Starting a business, employment regulation; enforcing contracts; getting credit 
and closing a business. 
15 See Commander and Tinn (2008) for more detail. 
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set of controls X, are included. These are secondary school enrolment and 
government expenditure to GDP; the latter being a measure of the size of 
government. The procedure is to run separate regressions that include the 
Doing Business variables from each of the four available categories — 
starting a business, employing workers, enforcing contracts and closing a 
business — which are entered separately (Columns 1–4) and then jointly 
(Column 5).  
Table 5 reports the results.  No statistically significant association 
with the expected sign can be found. The coefficients on procedures to start 
and time to close a business are weakly significant but wrongly signed.   
Yet, the existence of a relationship between institutions identified by 
Doing Business and growth cannot be completely ruled out. For a start, it 
is only possible to look at the growth rate over a very short period of time 
that could have been affected by business cycles. Second, the impact of in-
stitutions on growth is far more likely to be a longer term phenomenon and 
might not affect performance immediately. Third, only a subset of the Do-
ing Business indicators was available for 2003. It is also not possible to 
address the issues arising from potential reverse causality due to the ab-
sence of suitable instruments. The countries that have a potential to grow 
faster may have more incentives to develop institutions. However, this 
would likely result in overestimating the strength of relationship between 
the Doing Business indicators and growth. As there is no association, the 
importance of this is unlikely to be critical. 
Turning to the second component of the analysis, as the Doing Busi-
ness indicators might affect growth through their impact on intermediate 
outcomes, similar regressions relating intermediate outcomes to the indica-
tors are reported. The most recent available data on the intermediate indi-
cators are related to the contemporaneous Doing Business indicators. The 
estimates also use as controls the log of PPP adjusted GDP, government 
expenditure to GDP and secondary school enrolment. These results are re-
ported in Table 6. The results in the first column include only one relevant 
group of Doing Business indicators. The second column reports results 
when Doing Business indicators from all relevant categories are jointly in-
cluded. Exceptions are stock market capitalisation and the stock turnover 
ratio where the second column gives the impact of the overall investor pro-
tection index and first column gives the impact of subcomponents of the 
investor protection index individually.  
Table 6 shows that there are some — but very few — statistically sig-
nificant associations. Better legal rights are positively associated with pri-
vate credit, capital inflows and FDI. However, these relationships are ab-
sent for private bank credit, where it might have been expected to be 
stronger than with the broader measure of private credit. Legal rights are 
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also found not to be associated with higher investment. Better private and 
public registry coverage appears to be positively associated with higher 
private credit and private registries with private bank credit when only the 
‘Getting Credit’ indicators are included. However, the significance disap-
pears when all potentially relevant indicators are included in the regression. 
The same applies for the recovery rate when closing a business and bank 
credit, as well as for procedures for registering property and enforcing con-
tracts and the broader private credit measure. Better investor protection is 
associated with higher stock market capitalization but not with stock mar-
ket liquidity as measured by the stock market turnover ratio. Note that it is 
hard to argue that the causality of these statistically significant relation-
ships runs from institutions to better credit and stock market development, 
as the development of these markets will have naturally created a need for 
better regulation. Other relationships appear even weaker. For example, 
there are no significant and predictably signed associations with registering 
property indicators and construction, export and import with the trading 
across borders indicators, informal economy and starting business, employ-
ing workers and enforcing contracts and unemployment with employment 
indicators. Investment is unrelated to most Doing Business indicators, 
while there is a weak association with procedures to deal with licences and 
enforcing contracts.  
5. Why does the business environment explain so little? 
The analysis above suggests that neither at firm nor country level do 
measures of the business environment appear to have significant explana-
tory power when relating constraints to performance. This section ask why 
that is the case.   
Potential explanations fall into four broad categories. The first is that 
the various indicators may simply be mis-measured. The second is that the 
indictors may be incomplete and/or too specific. The third is that the under-
lying relationships may be more complex and the fourth is that the identifi-
cation strategy is incorrect.  
With respect to measurement, a starting point is to ask whether firm 
and country level measures of obstacles actually give broadly consistent 
responses. Commander and Tinn (2008) use firm level evidence from the 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys dataset containing over 30,000 firm level 
observations for at least 75 countries relating to the period from 1999–2006 
and relate responses in these firm level surveys to the Doing Business indi-
cators that are their closest match.  They find that there is no tight associa-
tion between firm level survey responses and the Doing Business meas-
ures. To understand why this might be the case, it is useful to look in more 
detail at the firm level evidence from the surveys. What emerges is that 
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there is large variation in responses, particularly with respect to variation 
within countries. Further, there is more variation within-industry than be-
tween-industry16, suggesting much variation in subjective responses. Given 
that the attributes of individual respondents’ cannot be controlled for, this 
variation is hard to explain. Clearly, subjective evaluations raise a host of 
questions regarding possible bias (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001).  
What is less clear is whether one or other of the measures is superior in the 
measurement of constraints. At this point, all that can be said is that there 
are major discrepancies between the two approaches that are difficult to 
understand, let alone explain. Any mis-measurement might come from ei-
ther source.  
With respect to the country level indicators in Doing Business, the ob-
jective of looking at an average representative firm is likely to be problem-
atic. First, there is the issue of how a representative business is defined. 
Second, focusing on an average firm obviously ignores heterogeneity 
among firms as well as sectoral specialisation in a country. The higher cor-
relation of the Doing Business indicators observed in high income coun-
tries might suggest that the templates are best designed for a representative 
firm in a high income country. If firms in less developed countries are en-
gaged in substantially different production activities, the constraints they 
face are likely to be very different.  
Similar sample selection issues are likely to affect the responses of 
firms more generally. If there are many obstacles in the business environ-
ment, only agents with the best entrepreneurial and/or managerial talent 
may be active. Further, it is unclear what entrepreneurial or managerial tal-
ent actually means in a poor business environment. For example, it may be 
that these entrepreneurs have the best ability for dealing with corruption 
rather than being the most dynamic in other more productive areas. Never-
theless, such issues are likely to create bias in firm responses. 
Both the Doing Business indicators and firm level responses are ulti-
mately subjective. Responses can be affected by the mood and personality 
of the respondent as well as by respondents adapting to the business envi-
ronment. While the first effect is likely to average out in the firm level sur-
veys, it does not necessarily average out in a small number of expert opin-
ions, as in Doing Business. To the extent that questions in Doing Business 
are more objective by trying to measure constraints more specifically — 
such as the time to enforce contracts — they may suffer from less possible 
bias than firm level surveys. The issue of adaptation is clearly a problem 
when evaluating the business environment using firm level subjective re-
                                                          
16 There are no obvious patterns when controlling for the size of firm or owner-
ship. 
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sponses. In this instance, it will not average out irrespective of the number 
of responses.  
Additional explanations for the lack of explanatory power could be 
that the variables and indicators that are collected are too specific. Take the 
example of credit and enforcing contracts. The theoretical literature often 
models this as the probability of avoiding repayment to the creditor (for 
example, Hart and Moore, 1994, Marimon and Quadrini 2006, Aghion et 
al., 2003). There is no direct measure of this in the Doing Business indica-
tors, while there are several proxies such as the time, procedures and cost 
of enforcing contracts. There are also important variables and indicators 
missing in both firm and country level surveys. For example, R&D and 
technology adoption are likely to be major sources of growth and incen-
tives to innovate are likely to be affected by intellectual property rights 
(Parente and Prescott, 1994). The incompleteness of the existing measures 
— as with Doing Business — is likely to be a problem.  
Then there is the validity of the assumption of a monotonic relation-
ship between country level indicators and economic performance. For ex-
ample, the correlation of the Doing Business indicators with GDP and with 
several intermediate outcomes appears to decline with income17. This re-
sult is probably not surprising. For example, investor protection is likely to 
be important in countries that have formal equity markets. In the absence 
of these markets, differences in minority shareholder protection are 
unlikely to affect performance. Another example concerns the substantial 
differences in the availability of skilled labour among countries. The tech-
nology that is appropriate in countries that are abundant in skilled labour 
may not be appropriate in countries that are not (Acemoglu, 2002). As a 
result, the constraints to productive activity in high vs. low income coun-
tries may be different depending on the availability of skilled labour. This 
suggests the presence of thresholds of income per capita or other indica-
tors, such as labour force or size of equity markets, at which constraints 
will matter or not. 
Finally, there is the issue of the identification strategy. In the context 
of firm level evidence, Carlin et al (2006) argue that the parameter esti-
mates from an equation relating a measure of performance to particular 
constraints can be biased for several reasons. The first is that many of the 
measures of constraints that have been collected may in fact be more in the 
nature of public goods that are an input into private production. As such, 
the issue of the endogeneity of public good supply will exist, as better per-
forming countries will generally have better levels of supply. Second, with 
respect to the demand for public goods, better performing firms will tend to 
                                                          
17 Commander and Tinn (2008). 
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demand better public goods provision. In other words, there may be a prob-
lem of reverse causality18. However, the analysis in this paper of the firm 
level evidence has used an instrumental variables approach in order to 
avoid these pitfalls and yet has been unable to find robust evidence of con-
straints having an impact on performance.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper addresses an important issue; the part played by the busi-
ness environment in explaining the performance of firms and countries. In 
recent years, it has become common to attribute a great deal to the business 
environment where ‘bad’ business environments — as measured by the ex-
tent of regulation or corruption — are argued to have a measurably adverse 
impact on performance. To explore whether this is warranted, the paper has 
used two types of datasets. In the first place, it used a large firm survey re-
lating to the transition countries. Secondly, it used the annual cross-country 
indicators contained in the World Bank’s Doing Business.  
The firm level data were analysed with a view to understanding the ef-
fects on performance of a firm’s ownership, competition, export orientation 
and, most particularly, the business environment. To minimise problems of 
endogeneity, instrumental variables were used, as well the average values 
of perceived constraints. The impact of the business environment variables 
was found, however, to be very limited. Few variables retained any ex-
planatory power once entered simultaneously rather than singly or once 
country, year and sector fixed effects were introduced. Similar conclusions 
were drawn from extending the analysis by using country level indicators 
from Doing Business. The analysis showed that country effects — but not 
business environment constraints — mattered for performance. However, 
these country effects are clearly capturing other sources of cross-country 
heterogeneity, rather than a single factor, such as the institutional environ-
ment. 
The second part of the paper then turned explicitly to looking at 
whether country level indicators of the business environment did better in 
explaining performance. Again, it was not possible to find any evidence 
that the Doing Business indicators were robustly related to GDP growth, 
although there was some limited correlation between the indicators and in-
termediate outcomes at an aggregate level.  
Finally, the paper looked at possible explanations for why neither firm 
nor country level measures of the business environment appeared to ex-
plain performance with any degree of precision. These included mis-
                                                          
18 More generally, in firm surveys the information on performance and con-
straints are raised simultaneously creating obvious problems.  
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measurement — including bias arising from subjective evaluation — mis-
specification, complexity and non-linearity. Reasons were given for why 
each of these factors might be relevant in explaining these largely absent 
associations.   
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